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Introduction to the book 'The Dynamics of Exclusionary Constitutionalism Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State' What does Israel's definition as a 'Jewish and democratic' state mean? How does it affect constitutional law? How does it play out in the daily life of the people living in Israel? This book provides a unique and detailed examination of the consequences of the 'Jewish and democratic' definition. It explores how the definition affects the internal ordering of the state, the operation of the law, and the ways it is used to justify, protect and regenerate certain features of Israeli constitutional law. It also considers the relationship between law and settler-colonialism, and how this relationship manifests itself in the constitutional order. The Dynamics of Exclusionary Constitutionalism offers a novel perspective on the Jewish and democratic definition rooted in constitutional theory and informed by a socio-legal approach. Relying on a wide range of court cases and statutes as well as secondary sources, the book shows how the definition is deeply embedded in the constitutional structure, and operates, as a matter of law, in a manner that concentrates political power in the hands of the Jewish citizens and excludes the Palestinian Arab citizens in Israel from the political process. Mazen Masri's study is a timely intervention in an increasingly important question, and is essential reading for those who want to understand Israel's character, its relationship with the constitutional order, and its impact on society.
Beginning with the collapse of the Soviet Union nearly twenty years ago, Western society has witnessed the emergence of a significant number of new countries striving to join the family of Western, democratic-style, states. Indeed, we are hopeful that this trend of democratization will continue and more societies will follow in the footsteps of these new states, including Arab-Moslem countries. The purpose of this article is to reemphasize some of the basic guidelines for these emerging new democratic states. There are some fundamental preconditions entailed in the process of becoming a democratic state. The mere existence of a written document entitled “Constitution” is not enough; a society is entitled to be considered a democratic state by the international community only if its legal system contains two attributes - the recognition of basic human rights and the idea that basic human rights are protected by some type of judicial review performed by an independent court system. Furthermore, it would be better if these basic human rights were enumerated in a written constitution. Nonetheless, based on the Social Contract concept, the recognition of these basic rights does not necessarily require a written document; rather, they may be “carved out” from overarching values hovering above the legal system of every democratic society. Accordingly, these basic rights cannot be eliminated by the legislature or even by a constitutional assembly. Moreover, there are different models of a written bill of rights: some contain only the basic human rights and are considered a “thin constitution” while others try to comprise a very broad amount of constitutional rights, not only of the “first generation” but also of the “second” and “third” generations as well. In the latter case where the bill of rights contains many socio-economic “positive” human rights , there is a risk that if the economic system is not ready for such rights, this bill of rights might instead become a lifeless and meaningless letter of law. The development of Israeli Constitutional Law may serve as a case study. United Nations Resolution 181 regarding the establishment of the Independent Jewish State required that the new state adopt a constitution that was to include basic human rights. As it appears, the new state had significant difficulties in following that requirement. The state of Israel was founded as a nation composed primarily of Holocaust survivors and refugees from around the world, without a practical democratic culture and tradition and without a written constitution, but with a long history of ongoing struggle for freedom, liberty, and justice. Immediately after its establishment, the State of Israel developed a reasonable system of recognition of basic human rights, however, without a written and comprehensive document. Furthermore, the concept of judicial review within its domestic legal system was fully recognized only 48 years later. This article discusses some of the constitutional developments in Israel. It offers emerging democracies some of the Israeli experience to consider and compare to their own situation. It discusses some of the omissions that were effected by the Israeli establishment, specifically by: the Constitutional Assembly, the Knesset (The Israeli parliament) and the judicial branch. The first omission was the circumvention of the above-mentioned UN resolution. The second was the failure of the Israelis to regard the Israeli Declaration of Independence as a legal document, and the third was the lack of acceptance and full implementation of the concept of judicial review. As will be discussed, none of these omissions was crucial nor did they stop the Israeli legal community from developing a constitutional system that recognizes basic human rights. The latest significant constitutional development is what has been known as the Constitutional Revolution. Indeed, it is too early to conclude whether this event should be regarded as a mistake or might be the appropriate cure to the above-mentioned omissions. I will offer my own interpretation for the development of a democratic society. I will attempt to show that there is a way how a basic bill of rights and the concept of judicial review can be developed gradually in a “common law fashion,” even without a written constitution. I will also emphasize the dangers and risks that may result from an overly aggressive judicial review system. Hence, the article may provide lessons for other nascent democratic societies and the international community as well, that they may learn from both the achievements and the mistakes of Israel.
Berkeley Journal of International Law
Hybrid Constitutionalism: The Israeli Case for Judicial Review and Why We Should Care2011 •
Fifteen years after the Israeli Supreme Court decided in Mizrahi that Israel's "Basic Laws" amount to Israel's formal Constitution and it enjoys the power of judicial review, the debate about Israel's constitutional development is far from over. This essay makes the following four propositions: First, the Israeli political branches have been debating the wrong question. Rather than lingering on the threshold question of whether or not Israel has a formal Constitution at all, they should be discussing what kind of Constitution is developing in Israel. Second, the consensus among scholars who recognize Israel’s formal Constitution is that its existence is best explained by the Constituent Authority theory. But they have adopted a myopic understanding of Israel’s constitutional development. Like so many other aspects of Israel’s national evolution, a single theory cannot adequately explain the existence of its formal constitution. Rather, this national rite of pas...
Journal of Civil & Legal Sciences
Constitutionalism, Law and Religion in Israel a State’s Multiple Identities2016 •
Thinking Palestine
The Persistence of the Exception: Some Remarks on the Story of Israeli Constitutionalism2008 •
The chapter moves in two directions. The first move aims to shed new light on the nature of Israeli constitutionalism by introducing into the debate the model of the ‘state of exception’, and the ongoing tension between constituent power on the one hand and constituted power on the other, thereby hoping to propose a new way of viewing the drama of Israeli constitutionalism. The second move works backward. Thus, rather than reading the debates over Israeli constitutionalism in light of theory, I aim – by contemplating the Israeli case – to revisit and shed some light on constitutional theory itself.
The Oxford Handbook of the Israeli Constitution (Aharon Barak, Barak Medina and Yaniv Roznai, eds., Oxford, Oxford University Press))
The History of Israeli Pre-State ConstitutionalismThis chapter analyzes the history of constitutionalism in Palestine during the late-Ottoman and British-colonial periods, showing that many of the main features of Israeli constitutional law have long-forgotten pre-state origins. Following a brief Introduction to the chapter, Section II discusses official constitutional texts produced during the late-Ottoman and Mandatory periods and also constitutional scholarship from that time. Section III explores the history of the creation of a Hebrew word for "constitution," showing how arguments over the term reflected competing conceptions of the nature of constitutions. The last section deals with Zionist constitutional thought, discussing practices and plans for the future Jewish entity in Palestine, created during the pre-state era.
Partitioning historic Palestine into two states is often presented as the most plausible solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This article examines the potential impact of such a development on the Palestinian citizens of Israel (PCI), primarily from the vantage point of Israel’s constitutional regime. The article explores three fundamental aspects of the Israeli constitutional system—its instability, the “Jewish and democratic” definition of the state, and the exclusion of the PCI from “the people” as the unit that holds sovereignty—and argues that the envisaged two-state solution will only reinforce the definition of Israel as a Jewish state and consequently provide further justification for the infringement on the rights of its Palestinian citizens.
This paper analyses the attempts of the current Israeli government to undo the liberal principles of the so-called constitutional revolution, which are specified in the Basic Laws " Human Dignity and Freedom " and " Freedom of Occupation ". The background to this endeavor is at least twofold: On the one hand, the coalition parties are trying to strengthen Jewish nationalist and religious rights at the cost of individual and minority rights; on the other hand, it is combined with an attack on the Supreme Court´s perceived role as a defender of those rights. Therefore, the paper argues that we can see the attempt to revoke the in any case limited constitutional anchorage of liberal democracy in favor of a majoritarian democracy, which gives collective values precedence over individual rights. 1 In its outlook, the paper refers to the repercussions of these developments for the European-Israel relations. This takes into account that the European Union traditionally frames itself as the defender of a liberal democracy, but sees at the same time developments similar to Israel in central and eastern European states. The current Israeli government coalition, which was formed after the election in 2015, is often considered " the most right-winged government " in the history of Israel. 2 This notion is not unfounded: While the government is not monolithic, all parties of the coalition Likud, Jewish Home, Yisrael Beitenu (which joined the government only several months after) Shas, Torah Judaism and Kulanu can be considered to be right of the center. This *Peter Lintl is a researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Policy (SWP) and head of the project " Israel and its regional and global conflicts: Domestic developments, security issues and foreign affairs " All internet sources have last accessed on 08.06.2018. 1 Note: The distinction here made does not refer to the more common distinction made originally by Arend Lijphart between majoritarian and consensus political systems (in which Great Britain would adhere to the former and Israel to the latter), but to the distinction between liberal and majoritarian ideas of democracy: Liberal democracies see constitutions and checks and balances as safeguarding minorities from majorities, whereas majoritarian politicians will portray these liberal stances as an infringement of democracy.
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science
A Study on Mechanism of Constitutional System in IsraelPhysics Letters B
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